
Of the economic choice games I’m
familiar with, I’m going to have to opt for the classic prisoner’s dilemma as
my favorite. While it’s hard to be emotionally
attached to a mathematical model—at least for me, though I’m sure there’s
someone out there who is—I believe it rightly inspires awe for the explanatory power
it provides.
It seems as if there’s an almost
limitless number of ways to adjust the parameters of the game: you can change
the number of players, iterate the game a certain number of times (or assume it’s
played indefinitely), alter the reward distributions, alter the participants’
knowledge of their partner’s intentions, and so on. Each alteration provides the game with new
explanatory powers. I don’t claim to be
familiar with all of them, but it’s clear that the prisoner’s dilemma can be
used to derive profound insights from fields as varied as political science,
economics, and even evolutionary theory.
The latter is probably my favorite
example of how the game can arrive at powerful theoretical explanations. If applied to evolutionary theory, the
prisoner’s dilemma (and, additionally, other economic choice games) can provide
a model by which altruistic behaviors may be selected for in nature. The explanation is perhaps too long to get
into here, but the gist of it is that if organisms enter into a game on the
assumption that both will cooperate on the first turn, then both will have the
greatest opportunity for long-term benefit.
This encourages altruistic behaviors, at least at the outset, though of
course rational self-interest can take back over if one of them cheats.
While I don’t understand every
application of the prisoner’s dilemma—there are few who actually do—it continues
to intrigue me like no other economic game.
I also find this game interesting as I believe when given the option people will also try to help themselves out and screw someone else over. According to the game, some individuals actually act together together to help one another and go against what some theories would predict.
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