Thursday, October 25, 2012

On Breaking Social Norms




To fulfill this little project, I decided, quite contrary to my normal inclinations, to make this morning’s C-2 ride as obnoxious as possible for every unfortunate soul within earshot.   

Once the bus driver had pulled away from the stop, I pulled out my phone and proceeded to have a very loud conversation with no one.  It went something like this:

“YEAH?”
“I’LL BE THERE IN A SECOND.”
“I’M ON THE C-2.”
“THE C-2.”
“THE C-2.”
“I SAID I’M ON THE C-2.” 
“YEAH, OK.  I’LL SEE YOU SHORTLY.”

I’m not sure how many people realized the conversation was fake, but the higher-than-is-acceptable volume of my voice had a demonstrable effect.  I was the target of a number of dirty looks, and the guy sitting across from me moved down a few seats.  Needless to say, there’s probably not much chance of me making friends with anyone on that bus.  (And thank God I didn’t know anyone.)

What was particularly interesting about this little venture was just how difficult it was to actually do it and break the social norm governing volume in a public place.  I was incredibly nervous before making my fake call and while making it.  I was trying the whole time to talk myself out of doing it, and because of that, I almost didn’t follow through.  And even after I had finished the ordeal, I could feel (and see, when I extricated my gaze from my lap) everyone on the bus staring daggers at me.  My cheeks flushed with the shame of my (truthfully very mild) transgression.

After a taste of the inward and outward shame afforded me by this incident, I can only imagine how hard doing something seriously offensive would be for me.

Saturday, October 20, 2012

Social Neuroscience Talk: Susan Fiske




Earlier in the academic year, I had the pleasure of attending a lecture by Princeton’s Susan Fiske titled “Varieties of (De)Humanizing: Divided by Status and Competition.”  Dr. Fiske focused primarily upon the thesis that social cognition and dehumanization, or the tendency of people to view members of outgroups as less-than-human, varies along predictable dimensions. 

These dimensions, warmth and competence, may be familiar from class.  Warmth represents how we view the social intent of the agent in question—whether they mean us good or ill—and competence represents how able the targeted person is capable of bringing about what they intend.  Dr. Fiske explained how high/low degrees of warmth and competence could be represented in a 2x2 grid, the quadrants of which correspond to certain social emotions.  These are pride (high warmth/high competence), corresponding to ingroup members; envy (low warmth/high competence); pity (high warmth/low competence); and disgust (low warmth/low competence), reserved for social outgroups like the homeless and drug addicts.

What was particularly fascinating was Dr. Fiske’s explanation of how changing the context of a person assessment changes how an experimental subject perceives that person neurologically, primarily in the medial prefrontal cortex.  For example, if researchers explained that an apparent drug addict were given a story in which they were attempting to go to rehab or something similar, the subject’s evaluation of that person would increase in warmth.  Moreover, if people with injuries (in the “pity” category) were explained to have been responsible for their injury, sympathy for that person diminished.  And amusingly, people seem to exhibit schadenfreude for people in the envy category (bankers, lawyers, etc.): they seem to enjoy the idea of bad things happening to them.

The talk was, in sum, a thoroughly engrossing experience and a testament to the explanatory power of social neuroscience to enthrall.

Thursday, October 11, 2012

Hormones



In 9th grade, when I was 14, my rather poor running technique caused me to develop shin splints after only a week or two in gym class.  One trip to the doctor later, and I was prescribed a mild steroid to treat the feeling of knives digging into my shins. 

I don’t particularly remember what steroid it was specifically, nor do I have concrete memory of how it was administered (though I believe it was in pill form).  In any case, taking this anonymous steroid certainly diminished the pain of walking significantly, though I began to notice other, mild changes in my behavior.  Now, one could possibly chalk this up to the placebo effect and my prior expectations of what steroids do (I remember thinking it was strange and oddly funny that I was taking steroids), but I definitely noticed little things.  I remember being more irritable, and I was less inhibited in trying the more “macho” aspects of gym class. 

Again, these were mild steroids, so the effects probably wouldn’t have been anything too significant.  Certainly, I didn’t experience anything close to “’roid rage,” but I was still happy to finally get off of them once my shin splints healed, and my mood seemed to improve noticeably.

Thursday, October 4, 2012

A Brief Overview of Emotion



It seems that the answer to the question “what is emotion?” changes depending upon the perspective invoked.  From the perspective of the layman, emotion encompasses various states of mind from happy and sad to angry and fearful.  Explaining what emotions are usually seems to elicit a description of experiencing these feelings without a hypothesis as to what underlies them.

Of course, there are other, more intricate perspectives which are too numerous to explore here.  However, it is perhaps most appropriate to consider emotions from a neuroscientific standpoint, and I think any scientifically useful definition of emotion must draw upon its neurological underpinnings.  The issue is hardly settled, but I’ve seen theories explaining emotion as cognitive interpretations of bodily states as well as heuristics that provide information or motivation without having to refer directly to conscious cognition.  As to whether emotions arise from interpretations of bodily states or are the result of cognitive processes causing these states, I do not know enough to speak.  However, the heuristic model of emotion seems to make sense from an evolutionary perspective.  For example, it would seem more adaptive for an organism to experience fear immediately and react to that motivation rather than having to reason through the situation before responding.

In any case, I believe that a definition of emotion must involve an evolutionary understanding of its function (from its possible role as a social signal as well as its role in motivating action) as well as an understanding of the underlying biology and neurobiology.